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Abstract
Brazil is soccer. The game is so deeply ingrained in daily life - in Brazilian
identity and self-esteem- that they define each other. Soccer is so profoundly
intertwined with Brazilian culture that familiarity with the sport begins early,
producing a bottomless pool of talent. Year after year, soccer stars seem to roll
out of Brazil like cars off a factory assembly line; it’s a natural talent that grows
in almost every Brazilian child. Soccer means passion to Brazilians; it is the
symbol of their nationality, as they have proven to be very the best at it.
Now, Brazil finally has been chosen to host the world’s largest sport event, one
that Brazil has won five times (more than any other country in the world), the
2014 World Cup. After dedicating their hearts and souls to the sport, the World
Cup will be brought to the Brazilian country, as passionate crowds will cheer for
their favorite team.
But as the event gets closer and closer, Brazil finally understands the implications
that come along with hosting something as big and powerful as a World Cup.
While the sport event itself might bring the country several benefits, such as job
creation with additional economic activities, Foreign Direct Investments, tourism
and infrastructure improvements, it is also forcing Brazil to spend beyond its
capacity. With a lack of commitment coming from the private sector, Brazil finds
itself in a desperate situation, where the country is required to utilize public funds
to make sure that it will be ready in time.
This, obviously, is not the perfect solution. After analyzing the model used by the
United States (a well-established country with a successful history of hosting
major sporting events and in funding sport facilities), I propose an alternative way
for Brazil to proceed with 2014 World Cup infrastructure funding. I have come to
the conclusion that there is no way that the present Brazilian model will work.
Given that stadiums do not generate great economic revenues, in the long run,
Brazil will find itself embedded in even greater debt. Currently, the Brazilian
Development Bank is funding at least 45% of all government - owned stadiums
(not a public good). This, however, is not sustainable, given that this money will
have to be paid back. So what do I propose? Tax holidays to the private sector to
spur critical private investment.
To date, the lack of participation from the private sector comes from (a) the belief
that stadiums do not generate enough revenues to significantly cover all the costs,
and (b) the “Brazilian cost” of doing business in the country. Reducing or
exempting the private sector from state and federal taxes on revenues generated
would incentivize private entities to invest in projects that the government is not
able to fund, and as a consequence, it would also give businesses room to grow, as
the private sector has proven to be more efficient in stimulating progress.
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Brazil has all the necessary tools to succeed and show the world that it can, too,
promote a life-changing event. All it needs to do is use its resources right. It is
Brazil’s turn to shine as it presents its most beautiful sport, one which Brazilians
know how to play as no other country does. Brazil is soccer. It’s the country’s
culture, identity, and nationality. Brazil will be hosting an event that defines it in
every single way, and it cannot go wrong.
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Advice for Future Honors Students
Writing a Capstone project is not easy. To tell the truth, it is probably one
of the most frustrating projects I had to do throughout my college career. But it
does get a lot easier if you enjoy what you are writing about, if it is something that
interests you. That is exactly what happened to me. It is important to understand
your chosen topic and to be curious to learn more about it. So, my first advice
would be: write about something you love.
But just because you are writing about something you love does not mean
it won’t take time. My biggest mistake was starting this project in the spring
semester of my senior year (for all business majors, be sure to take your EEE457
course in the Fall), thinking that it wouldn’t take too long to find all the necessary
data. Well, it did, and I did regret not starting this during my summer before
senior year. So, my second piece of advice would be: start early.
At the beginning, I thought I would be able to write this on my own, and I
couldn’t. It is extremely important to have someone guiding you the whole time;
an advisor and a reader who are willing to constantly meet with you is
indispensable. So, my third advice would be: Choose your reader and your
advisor wisely.
One of my biggest challenges was writing about something that hasn’t yet
happened, something that is still not part of history. It is hard to analyze a topic
when the numbers are constantly changing, news is constantly being updated, and
most of the data available are based on forecasts. Therefore, my fourth bit of
advice would be: Do not analyze something that will be happening in the near
future.
Writing a capstone project is supposed to be tough, but it’s fun! You are
supposed to learn a lot from your research, and most important, you are supposed
to enjoy learning about it. Writing this project on the 2014 FIFA World Cup was
very pleasing; I got to learn a lot about my country and the sport we adore.
Hopefully, you will find a topic you love too, just as I did! Best of luck!
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Chapter 1
About Brazil

History
Brazil, which is officially denominated the Federative Republic of Brazil,
was discovered by Pedro Alvares Cabral, a navigator and explorer from Portugal,
in 1500. In 1808, Dom Joao VI, along with the remaining Portuguese royal
family, fled from Napoleon’s army to Brazil, establishing his government in the
country. The colony was ruled by the family until September 7th, 1822, when
Dom Joao’s son declared Brazil’s independence and became the country’s
emperor, entitled Dom Pedro I.
After more than three centuries under Portuguese rule, the country
retained a monarchical system of government until 1888, which was when slavery
was abolished (by Princess Regent Isabel), and the military declared Brazil a
republic. The country then experienced over half a century of populist and
military government, with Getulio Vargas, a civilian, in the presidency. Vargas
remained a dictator until 1945. Between 1945 and 1961, Brazil had six presidents.
These years however, were marked by economic stagnation, high inflation, and
the growing power of radical political elements, which led to a coup by the armed
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forces in 1964 (with Humberto Castello Branco in power), followed by four other
senior army officers: Arthur da Costa e Silva (1967-69), Emilio Garrastazu
Medici (1969-74), and Ernesto Geisel (1974-79), who finally began a democratic
opening. Democracy was continued by his follower, Joao Baptista de Oliveira
Figueiredo (1979-85), who allowed the return of exiled politicians so that they
could run for state and federal offices once again.
Brazil continued having its presidents chosen by an electoral college
consisting of all members of Congress and six delegates from each state. After
electing Tancredo Neves to office, followed by his former vice president, Jose
Sarney, in 1989, Brazil finally completed its transition to a popularly elected
government, with the first direct presidential election in 29 years. Former
president, Fernando Collor, won 53% of the votes, but was forced to resign after a
major scandal that brought President Itamar Franco to office.
Since then, all the presidents in Brazil have been democratically elected,
starting with Fernando Henrique Cradoso, in 1994, who was elected with 54% of
the votes, followed by Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, elected in 2002, and then again
in 2006. In 2010, when Lula finally finished his term, the country held its sixth
consecutive election since the reestablishment of democracy, when Dilma
Rousseff, currently in office, became president.

Geography and People
Brazil is South America’s regional leader. Its capital is Brasilia, and its
official language is Portuguese. The majority of the population is Roman Catholic
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(74%). The country is the fifth largest country (with a total area of 8,514,877km2)
and the fifth most populous country in the world, with a population of around 190
million, and a population growth rate of 1.17%.
Six major groups now constitute the Brazilian population: Africans,
whose ancestors were initially brought to the country as slaves, the Portuguese,
indigenous people; and various European, Middle Eastern, and Asian immigrants
(especially Japanese) who have settled in Brazil since the 19th century. Brazil’s
urban population comprises 87% of the total population, with an annual rate of
change of 1.1%. Such growth aids economic development but also creates serious
social, security, environmental, and political problems for major cities.
Brazil’s major cities are Sao Paulo (19.96 million), Rio de Janeiro (11.836
million, Belo Horizonte (5.736 million), Porto Alegre (4.034 million) and Brasilia
(3.789 million). The country is located in Eastern South America, bordering the
Atlantic Ocean on the east and has a coastline of over 7,367km. It also borders
Uruguay to the South, Argentina and Paraguay to the south-west, Bolivia and
Peru to the west, Venezuela, Suriname, Guyana and French Guiana to the north,
and Colombia to the northwest.

Government
Brazil has 26 states and one federal district. Its executive branch
comprises the Chief of State, the head of government, and the cabinet. Both the
Chief of State and the Head of Government include President Dilma Rousseff and
Vice President Michel Temer. The Cabinet, which currently has almost 40
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members, is appointed by the president. Moreover, the country is democratically
run, with the president and vice president being elected by popular vote on the
same ticket every four years.
Brazil’s legislative branch is formed by the bicameral National Congress,
consisting of the Federal Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The Federal Senate
includes 81 seats, while the Chamber of Deputies includes 513 seats and members
are elected by proportional representation to serve four- year terms.
Lastly, Brazil’s judicial branch is formed by the Supreme Federal Tribunal
and the Higher Tribunal of Justice. Both tribunals have ministers and judges,
respectively, who are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate.
These people are appointed “for life”, but are obligated to leave office and retire
at the age of 70 (November, 2011).

Economy
Brazil recently overtook the UK as the world’s sixth largest economy,
outweighing that of all other South American countries. The country currently
boasts a low unemployment rate, below 6%, which, along with strong domestic
demand, has pushed 12-month inflation to 6.5%, above the government's official
target for inflation of 4.5%. Its currency is the real. Since 2003, Brazil has been
improving its macroeconomic stability, building up foreign reserves and reducing
its debt by shifting towards “Real” denominated and domestically held
instruments. Brazil still has an external debt of $396.2 billion.
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The economy is expected to grow 4% in 2012, with consumer and investor
confidence driving GDP up. Currently, Brazil’s Central Bank has the country’s
interest rates (called Taxa Selic) at a high of 11%, making the country an
attractive investment for foreign investors. Due to its high return, large capital
inflows have come into the country, driving up the value of the currency, the real,
by almost 30% since 2009. Even though the country is the largest recipient of
Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America, as a way to limit currency
appreciation, the government has introduced increased taxes on some foreign
investments.
The country is characterized by large and well developed manufacturing,
mining, and agricultural service sectors. Agriculture is a major sector in the
Brazilian economy, accounting for 6% of the country’s GDP. Brazil is also the
world’s largest producer of sugarcane, coffee, tropical fruits and has the world's
largest commercial cattle herd. In addition, Brazil is also an important producer of
soybeans, cotton, corn, cocoa and tobacco. The country is a major exporter of
commodities and natural resources, including lumber, iron ore, and tin. Brazil’s
various industries are also very developed, accounting for 28% of the country’s
GDP. These industries include automobiles, machinery, textiles, shoes,
computers, commercial aircraft, machinery, motors, vehicles, chemicals and
petrochemicals, cement, and lumber. Moreover, Brazil has a refined services
industry, which includes developed telecommunications, banking, energy,
commerce, and computing sectors (CIA Fact book, 2008).
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Trade
Brazil has an export oriented economy, and its main trading partners are
the United States, the European Union and Argentina. The country’s major
imports are: minerals, petroleum, chemicals, fertilizers, machinery, vegetables,
animal products, cereals, electrical products, electronics, vehicles, metals, surgical
instruments, and scientific equipment, while its major exports are processed
foods, cocoa beans, seeds, juices, fruit products, meat, animal products,
vegetables, metals, vehicles, machinery, animal feed, textiles, footwear, and
petroleum products.
Brazil dominates the Mercosur- the Common Market of the South, in
terms of both population and economics. Other countries that are part of the
Mercosur are Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. The country is also a
leading player of the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round. President
Rousseff is seeking expanded trade ties with developing countries as the main
component of plans to generate growth in the country.

Transportation
Brazil has over 700 airports with paved runways around the country, and
over 3,000 with unpaved runways. Its railways travel a total of 28,538 km, while
its roadways cover 1,751,868 km. Before 1996, most of the transportation systems
were government-owned, but that changed when privatization, initiated by the
Brazilian government after 1996, brought many investors to the
telecommunications and transportation sectors. Privatization in the transportation
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sector has been active for over 20 years now. The Brazilian Railroad industry was
privatized through concession contracts with a duration of 30 to 60 years.
Similarly, due to intense deterioration in the country’s highway system, the
Brazilian government granted concessions for those highways to private
companies, so that they could improve and maintain the highways in return for
revenues collected from tolls. The ports system and airports are also undergoing a
change to privatization. The Brazilian government has moved towards privatizing
the country’s five largest airports as a way of improving the nation’s
infrastructure and allowing it to receive a massive influx of visitors.
The process of modernization of transportation in Brazil started in 1970, at
a time when the country was facing huge growth. However, as growth at that time
did not last, some construction projects were not completed and still remain
unfinished. Road transportation, for example, corresponds to 58% of the national
logistic system, however, 69% of the Brazilian roads are in bad condition
(National Confederation of Transportation, 2011). Forty seven percent of
Brazilian railways are concentrated in the Southeast and they are the second most
important transportation method in Brazil, corresponding to 28% of logistic totals.
However, these railways have proven to be ineffective. Railways have few routes
available, reducing flexibility in operations, operate at low speed, due to the
invasion of local communities on the railroad surroundings, and are very costly.
Aware of the necessity of modernizing the railway system, the federal
government aims to construct 12.000 km of new railroads by 2023 (National
Confederation of Transportation, 2011).
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Due to the increased affordability of airline tickets, Brazil also faces a
major saturation of the aerospace sector, resulting in innumerable flight
cancellations and delays. Brazil also does not invest in airplanes for cargo
transportation, and the existing planes are mostly to transport passengers.

Financial Markets
The Bolsa de Valores de Sao Paulo (BOVESPA) is Brazil’s largest stock,
commodity and futures exchange index, tracking the performance of 50 large
Brazilian companies, including Vale, Petrobras and Embraer. The BOVESPA is
one of the fastest growing international stock indices in the world and already has
a leadership position in Latin America. The country’s upgraded credit rating, as
well as its macroeconomic stability, have made its stock market very attractive to
investors looking for emerging market returns.
Brazil also has a strong banking system, a sector that should benefit as
investment flows return to the country. The country’s main financial institutions
are composed of commercial banks1, universal banks with commercial activities,
savings bank2 and credit unions3. Banco Central do Brasil, Brazil’s central bank,
is the entity responsible for the stability of the purchasing power of the Brazilian
currency, as well as the accuracy of the country’s financial system (March, 2012).
___________________________________________
1

Commercial Banks: Collect demand and savings deposits and are traditional
credit providers to firms (especially working capital) and households.
2
Savings Bank: Collect demand and savings deposits and operate strongly in
credit to housing.
3
Credit unions: Member-owned financial co-operatives. These institutions are
created and operated by its members and profits are shared amongst the owners
(Investopedia, 2012).
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Chapter 2
Futebol: Soccer, the Brazilian Way

History of “Futebol” in Brazil
“Brazil is soccer”.
The History of futebol, or soccer, in Brazil began during the late 19th
century, when the game was introduced to the country by an English sportsman,
Charles Miller. After learning how to play the game at his boarding school on the
outskirts of Southampton, Charles Miller brought a deflated football in his
luggage on one of his trips back to Brazil. When he arrived in Brazil, Charles
noticed that no one in the city of Sao Paulo knew how to play futebol. The
country had adopted several British customs, including cricket, but not futebol.
It was then that Charles introduced Brazil to its own identity. The
young Englishman pumped up the ball, took his friends to an open area, divided
them into two separate teams, and explained the rules of the game. After a few
months, the game was being played all over the city, and in a few years, it had
conquered the entire country. Even though the British were the ones who invented
the rules of futebol, Brazilians rapidly recast the game in their own image
(Levine, 1980).
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The Brazilian soccer national team is famous, and its players are
heroes around the world. One of the most famous players in the history of the
game is Pelé, who played the first three World Cups, and accumulated the highest
number of goals in the history of soccer, with almost 1,300 during the course of
his career. Then the Three R’s, Ronaldinho, Ronaldo and Rivaldo, helped bring
the sport to its highest level. It was mostly due to the teamwork of these three
players that Brazil won the 2006 World Cup. Ademir, another famous Brazilian
player, scored most of the goals that won the 1950 World Cup, and has played in
more international games than any other player. Romario, a more recent star of
the Brazilian team, helped Brazil win the 1994 World Cup, and was awarded
Player of the Year that year.
Today, Brazilian futebol is famous all over the world for its vivid
performance and exceptional techniques. The country has produced most of the
world’s most famous players. In fact, the Soccer World Cup, the world’s most
famous sporting event, has been won by Brazil 5 times, more than any other
country in the world. For that reason, Brazilians proudly call themselves “Penta”,
the Portuguese word for “five”, namely, for winning the world cup five times
(Pardue, 2002).

Futebol as a National Identity
“Futebol is so deeply, so passionately interwoven into the
fabric of Brazilian culture that the two entities are
inextricably linked, they define each other and share an
intrinsic identity, an instantly recognizable global image”
(Mann, 2009).
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As the only nation that has participated in all FIFA World Cups and the
only nation to win the competition five times, Brazil obviously has the richest
tradition of soccer excellence in the world. Futebol is deeply ingrained in daily
lives – and in Brazilian identity and the self-esteem of the Brazilian population.
Familiarity with the sport begins early, leading to a bottomless pool of talent. At
the age of three, a Brazilian boy probably already knows how to dribble the ball.
At the age of seven, he is probably already playing the game well in any open
space available - a clearing in the jungle, an empty lot in a large city, a pasture or
a beach – and carrying the ball around with them, if they are lucky enough to
afford a ball (if not, they will use cans, bottles, etc.).
Regardless of the economic growth that the country is enjoying, Brazil
continues as a nation with a large part of its population living in poverty. It is the
poor, however, that have found success in the game as their fastest ticket to
prosperity and status. Famous players like Ronaldinho and Robinho encourage
poor boys to aim high and dedicate themselves to a game that has no limit (Larry,
2006).
This hunger for success, however, is not where the passion begins. The
ingenuity and expertise with which Brazilians play the game has to do with the
unpredictability of life in Brazil, a country where improvising and being creative
at harsh times can be the solution to many of life’s challenges. Beginning in their
youth, Brazilians learn to “dribble” around the rules and barriers they face.
"It's the foundation of our music and art, too, and that
intuitive ability to sidestep the rules and improvise on the
spot is what distinguishes the great player from the
excellent." (Tostao, 2011).
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The 2014 World Cup in Brazil
In less than three years, the world’s greatest sporting event will be
heading to Brazil, the country that introduced the notion of such a beautiful game.
For the first time in 64 years, this event will come to Brazil’s shores as passionate
crowds cheer for their favorite team. Fans across Brazil are rubbing their hands in
anticipation of such a great event, as Brazilians are known for dedicating their
hearts and soul to the game. After becoming the major success story of the
tournament with a record of five victories, as well as having fielded some of the
greatest names in soccer history, it seems appropriate that Brazil gets the honor of
hosting the world’s greatest sport event: the 2014 World Cup.
Brazil has submitted the names of eighteen stadiums for consideration for
the 2014 FIFA World Cup, 14 to be renovated and four to be built. In May 2009
FIFA announced the 12 cities that will be hosting 2014 World Cup matches: Belo
Horizonte, Brasília, Cuiabá, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Manaus, Natal, Porto Alegre,
Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, and São Paulo. In each of the host cities, work is
underway to plan, construct, and modernize the stadia and transportation
infrastructures which will be necessary to host games.
As the Brazilian population gets more and more excited about hosting the
event that defines Brazilian identity, questions arise about whether or not the
country will be ready for such an event. Even with its improving economy, the
country finds itself with aggravated challenges most notably in organization,
mobility and safety. Everything from paved roads, an efficient rail system and
modern transportation hubs, is lacking. Brazil is behind schedule, and time is
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running out. With less than three years remaining to the FIFA World Cup, how
much money will be invested so that the country can develop all the necessary
infrastructure? Where should this money be coming from in order to finance these
investments? What are the economic benefits and implications of investing
billions of dollars in this one-time event? Should Brazil be expecting substantial
growth after the sporting event? These are all questions to be addressed in this
Capstone study.
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Chapter 3
Challenges to the 2014 World Cup

Existing Challenges
One of Brazil’s main problems is the so called “Brazil Costs”, which are
the increased operational costs associated with doing business in Brazil. These
costs come from corruption, lack of security, excessive layers of bureaucracy in
the country, a high tax burden, expensive labor costs, economic instabilities, high
interest rates, and the underdevelopment of infrastructures, each of which directly
affects the 2014 World Cup.

Infrastructure Challenges
Infrastructure is a main problem in Brazil. Road transport is responsible
for more than 60% of the inputs delivery for production and consumers, however,
70% of the existing roads are either bad or very bad. This sector’s efficiency
depends on stable investment flows for the construction and maintenance of
highways, but the country has only seen a small improvement in this sector in the
last three years. The improvements in Brazil’s infrastructure are due to a growth
acceleration program created by the government, called Programa de Aceleracao
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de Crescimento (PAC)4. Expenditures are still below what is needed for proper
World Cup preparation, which has led to long and expensive road transportation
within the country (Ramalho, 2010).
Brazil also lacks the airport capacity to cope with the anticipated visitor
influx. While internal air traffic volumes have progressively increased due to
higher income in the country, airports have suffered from low investment in
expansion and modernization. If Brazil actually receives more than one million
tourists during the World Cup (as South Africa did), there will be a lot of air
traffic, with ticket costs skyrocketing due to this increase in demand. Since the
distance between the host cities is extremely long, transportation costs in Brazil
are a crucial challenge for the World Cup logistics system.

Violence & Favelas
A further consideration is the favelas. The census conducted in 2000 by
the IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica) defines a favela as
an aglomerado subnormal (sub-normal agglomerate). This means that the area
has over 51 houses, most of them lacking land title or official land documentation.
They are basically shantytowns, where houses are generally built on top of each
other, with no safety at all. Residents of favelas occupy lands that are not theirs
because they cannot afford housing; Rio de Janeiro alone has over 811
_______________________________
4

PAC – A Program launched by the federal government after observing and
identifying the need to promote an efficient and extensive infrastructure network
in the country. PAC will use about US$547billion invested between 2011 and
2014, the majority of the budget being directed towards infrastructure spending.
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favelas (IBGE, 2011).
Favelas are part of Brazilian society and culture; however, they are a
major site of violence and drug trafficking. In order to control the favelas, special
police forces, such as the UPP (Unidade da Policia Pacificadora) and BOPE
(Batalhao de operates Policiais Especiais) are constantly policing the areas, but
the process of pacification is complicated and violent. This process includes an
invasion where the police open fire and often kill a select group that they believe
are the most powerful drug traffickers in the area. During this invasion, citizens of
the city avoid leaving their homes in order not to be the victims of stray bullets. In
favelas without UPPs, drug traffickers serve as a form of police to residents,
enforcing control and order in the most violent ways possible (2010).
Therefore, Brazil is deeply concerned with crime and drug trafficking,
especially in favelas. To solve this problem, the government has been "cleaning
up" these areas to make them suitable for the 2014 World Cup, a major impact to
be addressed later in this study. In an effort to prepare for the games, popular
cities such as Rio de Janeiro have instituted programs to improve the quality of
the police force, emphasizing training and increasing task force deployment. Still,
this situation poses a continuing threat to visitors of the World Cup.

Project Delays: Brazil’s Major Costs
With little more than two years before the World Cup starts, Brazil is still
behind on construction for the event. Construction experts and local government
officials worry that bureaucracy and lack of planning have become an issue to the
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host country and have proven costly, leading to many missed opportunities in the
soccer country. According to experts, the Brazilian government spent too much
time celebrating the award of the 2014 games before starting to prepare.
Even though the World Cup has accelerated many infrastructure projects
that will benefit Brazil, several projects will not be ready for the event, and some
will not even leave the drawing board. According to government officials, by the
end of 2011, renovation work had yet to be started in five of the 13 airports that
will be continuously used throughout the sporting event, seven of the 12 host
cities had not begun any infrastructure work, and only nine of over 50
transportation projects were being worked on. Lastly, one of the most crucial
transportation systems that has to be built, the high - speed train linking Sao Paulo
to Rio de Janeiro (the two most important cities), is not certain to be ready for the
2016 Olympics, two years after the World Cup (2011).
According to Jose Roberto Bernasconi, the president of Sinaenco, a
Brazilian association of architectural and consulting engineering companies that
has been keeping track of infrastructure work,
“Brazil will host a good World Cup, I don’t think there is
much doubt about it, but the country will not enjoy the kind
of legacy that it could have enjoyed hosting an event of this
magnitude,” he said. “It’s not going to reach its full
potential because the government and organizers took too
long to start getting things going after Brazil was chosen
the host” (NY Times, 2011).

Increase in Costs Associated with the World Cup
After analyzing two documents released by the government reflecting the
costs for the 2014 World Cup, I calculated that the necessary investments for the
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event increased R$2.7 billion, or 11.6% from January 2011 to September 2011.
This conclusion was based on a comparison of the Ministry of Sports - 1ST
Balance Sheet of the World Cup construction, released on January 2011, and the
Transparency Gateway (Portal da transparência da Controladoria-Geral da União,
CGU), available to the public (GCU, 2012).

Table #1 Increase in Costs
Infrastructure

Jan/2011 (R$ mil)

Feb/2011 (R$ mil) Change

Variation

Stadiums

5,629.90

6,116.20

486.30

9%

Urban Mobility

11,896.20

13,112.70

1,216.50

10%

Airports

5,561.00

6,462.40

901.40

16%

Ports

740.70

898.90

158.20

21%

Total

23,827.80

26,590.20

2,762.40

12%

* Both documents do not include any costs for hospitality or public safety.

Who pays for the extra cost?
The major concern with the delay of projects is that the Brazilian
population is paying the tab. Bad planning is costly. In Belo Horizonte, one of the
major host cities, for example, there has long been a need for a second passenger
terminal at the city’s international airport, and the World Cup preparation would
be the perfect opportunity to complete such a project. However, due to delays, it
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was abandoned, and now the money will be spent on temporary facilities to
accommodate passengers during the duration of the championship.
Therefore, due to delays on construction, Brazil will be spending at least
an extra R$2.7 billion just to accelerate projects. This increase is due to the fact
that a larger number of workers will have to be hired to complete stadiums and
infrastructure in time for the event. These workers will work nonstop, drawing
additional shifts, overtime, and wages. In addition, there are the escalating costs
of raw materials being used (Sporting News, 2011).
Furthermore, amid increasing concerns about delays in the progress of
getting ready to host the World Cup, workers renovating the soccer stadiums for
the 2014 event in northeastern Brazil have gone on strike, demanding the payment
of delayed salaries. According to FIFA, the World Cup preparations are already
behind schedule, and this strike over back payment and benefits will certainly
create even more delays at several venues.
In addition, FIFA has also seen a delay by the Brazilian Congress
Commission on the 2014 World Cup Law, which was supposed to be approved by
February 15th, 2012. Commission members, however, asked for additional time to
study its implications regarding alcohol sales, discounted tickets to students and
elders, and advertising rules. The major concern in the country is that FIFA
requirements should not be allowed to take priority over domestic national laws,
and while Jérôme Valcke insists that permission for the sale of alcohol is nonnegotiable, the Brazilian legislation has banned it at soccer grounds since 2003.
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With the delay of this law, even more delays will be created for the preparation of
the event.
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Chapter 4
Financial Investments

Definition of Terms
The announcement of the choice of Brazil as the host country for the 2014
FIFA World Cup highlighted the need for the country to improve its existing
infrastructure, including airports, highways and stadiums. But how much will this
cost and how will the country fund all of these reforms? Before introducing my
analysis of the costs and of how the country should finance all of this change, I
should first define a couple of terms that will be used throughout my study:

Public Private Partnership (PPP): Involvement of private enterprise (in
the form of management expertise and/or monetary contributions) in government
projects aimed at public benefit (FreeDictionary, 2011). The primary feature of a
PPP is that it is a contract between a government entity and a private entity, where
the private entity gets rewarded based on outputs.
The provision of public services and infrastructure has always been part of
the government’s responsibility. Nonetheless, with growing population pressures,
urbanization and other trends, the state’s capability to effectively address the
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public’s necessities through traditional means has become very hard, which has
led governments worldwide to gradually seek out the private sector to
complement public investments and provide public services through public
private partnerships.
A PPP brings together different stakeholders to the operation of a given
project. To accomplish this, it combines private investors into a Special Purpose
Entity (SPE), so that they can share responsibilities to provide the necessary
finance to carry out the project. The long - term contract is usually between 25 to
35 years, and the SPE signs a contract with the public sector, for which the
expected cash flow of the project is guaranteed.
In Brazil, the use of PPP initiatives had been planned to take a significant
share of infrastructure investments (International Monetary Fund, 2004). The PPP
law, enacted in the country in 2004, represented a major advance for public
managers, since projects that were previously considered non-viable, were finally
commenced. The law, however, authorizes a PPP contract only if it is valued at
least twenty million reais (Brazilian currency) and if its period of service is more
than 5 years. PPP projects are also a way to distribute risks between the private
and public sectors, where both partners share the responsibility of making
investments, and the government is always able to play a role in terms of
supporting or coordinating the construction of the projects. The law is relatively
recent, but there currently are a few PPP projects in the country, especially in the
area of transportation, for it is a segment that offers greater business opportunities
(NCPPP, 2000).
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Private Sector: The part of the economy that is not state-controlled and is
run by individuals and companies for profit. The private sector encompasses all
for-profit businesses that are not owned or operated by the government
(Investopedia, 2012).

Public Sector: The part of the economy concerned with providing basic
government services. The public sector might provide services which benefit all
of society (such as public education) rather than just the individual who uses
aservice (Investopedia, 2012).

Concessions: The rights conferred by a public body to a private entity to
engage in economic activities of common interest. A PPP is a form of concession.
Legally the Brazilian government offers three types of concessions (Kerf, 1998):

• Traditional Concessions: Private Company charges users for the services
provided. (Ex. Telecommunications and energy).
• Administrative Concessions: The government makes periodic payments to a
private company for services provided. (Ex. Waste management and prisons).
• Subsidized Concessions: A private company charges users and receives periodic
payments from the government for services provided (Ex. Low- traffic toll roads).

Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES): Founded in 1952, the
BNDES is a public financial institution controlled by the Brazilian government. It
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is responsible for the medium and long term investment credit policy of the
Brazilian government and is entitled to lend funds to Brazilian companies. In
projects that the BNDES finances, the partner company is usually required to
provide a minimum of 20% of the total investment amount. The maximum
participation of the BNDES usually varies between 60% and 70% of the total
investment. The BNDES’ main purpose is to invest in the private sector, as well
as support projects aimed at environmental protection and its’ recovery (BNDES,
2012).

CAIXA: A government-controlled financial institution operating
throughout Brazil. This bank engages in several business activities including real
estate loans, basic sanitation, urban infrastructure, development work and
commercial banking. CAIXA’s subsidiaries manage development funds,
including Brazil's federal unemployment insurance fund (FGTS). The bank is also
the government’s main fiscal agent, providing funding for federal housing,
education and infrastructure projects. CAIXA was recently selected to assist in
programs such as Brazil's growth acceleration plan (PAC) (CAIXA, 2012).

FGTS - Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço (Guarantee Fund for
Length of Service): A fund created to protect employees dismissed without just
cause. At the beginning of each month, employers, on behalf of their employees,
make a deposit into an account in Caixa linked to their employment contract. The
amount is equal to 8% of each employee’s salary. The FGTS also funds housing
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programs and sanitation and urban infrastructure programs, benefiting society in
general (CAIXA, 2012).

Investments for the World Cup
At the beginning of February 2011, it was announced by the Brazilian
National Development Bank (BNDES) that investments in infrastructure
(including urban mobility and stadium construction) should increase from R$ 199
billion in 2005 – 2008 to R$274 billion through 2010-2013. This represents an
increase of 37%, and amounts to about 2.2% of Brazil’s GDP.

Table #2 Brazil: Infrastructure Investment Plans (2010 - 13)
Sectors

R$ Billion

% of Total

% of GDP per Year

Electricity

92

34%

0.7%

Telecommunication

67

24%

0.5%

Sanitation

39

14%

0.3%

Railways

29

11%

0.2%

Highways

33

12%

0.3%

Ports

14

5%

0.1%

Infrastructure

274

100%

2.2%

Source: GT Investimento, Morgan Stanley, 2010
According to the National Bureau of Statistics (IBGE), Brazil’s private
sector accounts for the majority of the investments in the country (90%), while the
public sector accounts for about 10%. In infrastructure however, the role of the
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public sector is significantly higher, and this sector has accounted for at least half
of the country’s investments in infrastructure during the past 10 years. This rising
public sector spending has brought Brazil’s BNDES into play, and the National
Bank will be funding a huge part of the investments for the World Cup (Morgan
Stanley, 2010).

BNDES Financial Rates
The BNDES has already funded R$3,6 billion in stadium infrastructure
investments needed for the World Cup, and will still be lending a lot more. More
money will be going to the improvement of airports and two distinct programs:
the BNDES Arenas Program for the World Cup 2014 (BNDES ProCopa Arenas)
and the ProCopa Turismo. The ProCopa Arenas is a program financed by
BNDES, which supports the construction and refurbishment projects of arenas
that will host the 2014 World Cup games, as well as the surrounding areas. The
ProCopa Turismo is a program developed by the Ministry of Tourism in
partnership with BNDES, to finance the renovation and construction of hotels in
order to expand the capacity and quality of accommodations for tourists who will
be coming for the World Cup.
As a way to enhance the use of its resources and decrease the risk,
BNDES will share the risk involved in loan operations with other financial
institutions. For the projects the Bank will be financing, the private sector will be
responsible for providing at least 20% of the total investment amount, which is
less than the BNDES usually requires to participate in projects (the maximum
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participation of BNDES varies between 60% and 70% of the total investment, but
for the World Cup, BNDES will be taking on an 80% participation) (BNDES,
2012).
The financing for projects by BNDES is provided through lines of credit
called FINEM (Financing for Business Ventures) in a Project Finance model. This
type of operation happens through corporate support (directly to companies), or in
the form of project finance (indirectly, through the creation of Special Purpose
Entities). The interest rate charged by BNDES on loan operations is calculated
according to the following criteria (FGV, 2012):
Direct Operation: Financial Cost + BNDES Basic Spread + Credit Risk
Rate
Indirect Operations: Financial Cost + BNDES Basic Spread + Financial
Intermediation Rate + Financial Institution
The financial cost is the BNDES’ cost of raising funds, which might be any of the
following (BNDES, 2012):
1. Long-Term Interest Rate (TJLP) – This rate is established by the Brazilian
Central Bank and takes into consideration the rate of inflation over the next 12
months as well as the real international interest rate, plus the medium- to longterm assessment of the country’s risk.
2. BNDES Monetary Unit (UMBNDES): The UMBNDES rate is based on the
average cost of the BNDES’s Currency Basket, which are the bank’s debt
obligations in foreign currencies. The cost of the Currency Basket is based on
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the rates and charges, including taxes, applicable to the BNDES’ debt
obligations in foreign currencies, readjusted on a quarterly basis.
3. US Dollar + Libor Rate5.
4. US Dollar + Fixed Rate.
The BNDES Basic Spread is the rate set by the BNDES to pay its
administrative and operational costs and its fee. This rate is determined by Bank
policies and might change depending on the type of project the bank is financing.
The BNDES basic spread will be 0.9% per year, plus the rate of risk of the
operation, which can range from 0.46% per annum 3.57% per year.
The Credit Risk Rate varies in relation to the Bank’s evaluation of the
company that is applying for the loan. If it is a direct operation, this rate varies
from 2.5%; if it is indirect, the rate is determined by the financial intermediary.
(BNDES, 2012).

_________________
5

London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR): The interest rate that the banks charge
each other for loans (Investopedia, 2012).
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Chapter 5
A Case Study – South Africa & Brazil

Macroeconomic Comparison
Brazil and South Africa share many similarities. Both countries are
the largest economies in Africa and Latin America, respectively, and are both part
of the BRIC countries. Along with that, both South Africa and Brazil have
suffered from long dictatorships in their histories and still face huge income
inequalities. Lastly, Brazil and South Africa share similar organizational problems
and poor infrastructure in regard to hosting major sporting events such as the
World Cup.
The main difference between the two countries arises when dealing with
soccer - the sport’s techniques and the way is it embedded in each country’s
culture. While soccer is the national sport in Brazil, almost taken as a religion; in
South Africa the sport hasn’t had the same social and cultural impact.
Below are some differences and similarities between economic
indicators for both Brazil and South Africa in 2009:
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Table # 3 Brazil & South Africa Economic Indicators
Indicators

Brazil

GDP (Current US$ billions)

1,575.20

276.4

GDP per capita (current US$1000)

8.2

5.7

GDP per capita, PPP (current international $1000)

10.3

10.1

Gini Index

0.57

0.58

Life Expectancy at Birth, total (years)

72.4

51.5

Literacy Rate, Adult total (% of people aged 15+)

90

89

Population, Total

192

48.7

8,514.90

1,219.10

7.3%

25%

Surface Area (sq. thousand km)
Unemployment Rate

South Africa

Source: World Development Indicators Database, 2009

The similar GINI coefficients shows that both countries share a high
level of income inequality, and the literacy rate for both countries is also almost
the same. Brazil’s GDP is about six times larger than South Africa’s; the
country’s per capita PPP GDP is almost the same as well. However, as Brazil is a
more developed country, it also has a much lower unemployment rate than South
Africa’s, and its life expectancy is also a lot longer.
However, even though these two countries are two of the most
developed among the underdeveloped countries, they still lag behind the high
income that European countries have (including Greece and Portugal), which is
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three to seven times higher than Brazil’s. These differences come from historical
development.

South Africa’s Costs
The amount of public money that was spent on World Cup- related
projects in South Africa were much greater than expected. To get a better idea of
the costs associated with such an event, it is important to compare the amount of
public money that was actually spent to the initial cost estimates put forward
when South Africa was announced as the host city. Past experience shows that at
the time of the announcement, the benefits of hosting such a worldwide known
event were overestimated, while total costs tended to be underestimated, and the
2010 FIFA World Cup was no exception.
In 2004, Grant Thornton, a consultancy firm, estimated the total costs
would be around R26 billion. That same consultancy, however, now estimates
that the final cost was around R55 billion, which accounts for 6% of South
Africa’s GDP. The national government alone spent around R33.7 billion, not
including spending by provinces and host cities.

FIFA Profit
Another major difference between Brazil’s upcoming World Cup and
South Africa’s World Cup is the profit flowing to FIFA. At a Local Organizing
Committee (LOC) board meeting in Rio de Janeiro on January 20th, 2012, Jerome
Valcke, FIFA’s Secretary General, outlined his expectations for the 2014 FIFA
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World Cup to be a profit of $1.2 billion. This differs significantly from the profit
of $631 million FIFA made after the South Africa World Cup. According to
Valcke, 80% of the money will be going back to FIFA football in the form of
financial aid (2012).

Infrastructure Costs
Brazil’s infrastructure budget for the World Cup is a lot higher than
South Africa’s, reflecting the difference in the size of the population, and in
infrastructure quality. While Brazil plans to spend at least R$274 billion
(approximately $150 billion) in infrastructure between 2010 - 2013, South Africa
spent R846 billion ($107 billion) in that same time period. The South African
transportation system is much better maintained than that of Brazil; the public has
access to an available network of highways, which facilitated travel between the
nine host cities. The country also inaugurated a high-speed train (Gautrain)
connecting the Johannesburg airport to the Sandton District, making it easier for
citizens and tourists to get around. Lastly, improvements made on the
Johannesburg and Cape Town airports, as well as the construction of a new
airport in Durban, facilitated air traffic and passenger services. Airlines offered
more internal flights that were not offered before, and pilots and air attendants
were trained for the event. Still, all the infrastructure developments in South
Africa were not enough, and the urban mobility in the country became one of the
weakest points of the 2010 World Cup.

B a r r e t o | 33

South Africa faced bad logistics planning, as well as lack of information
about bus lines connecting stadiums around the country. Several districts with a
high concentration of tourist attractions could only be reached by cars, causing
miles of traffic jams that surrounded the stadiums of Johannesburg. The country
also faced insufficient transportation solutions, leading to chaos in all the host
cities. This can be a much bigger issue in Brazil if the country does not invest in
transportation. Brazil’s largest cities, such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo,
already have very hectic transportation systems.
The amount of public money spent on the event proves that the local,
regional, and national governments failed to minimize costs for the public. Most
of South Africa’s infrastructure was provided by the country’s national
government, including parastatal companies, which are companies owned or
controlled wholly or partly by the government. The government was also involved
in funding the World Cup through the Expanded Public Work’s Programme, a
program aimed at providing income relief through temporary work for the
unemployed and through public-private partnerships, which is a case very similar
to that of Brazil. In addition, the South African government pursued foreign direct
investment to attract investors into areas that needed infrastructure, so that foreign
companies built, owned and operated the facilities.
Due to the fact that spending for the World Cup came mostly from the
national budget, it is relevant to ask whether the World Cup- related
infrastructural developments benefitted all South Africans or mainly residents
who lived around the stadium area. This is one of the biggest issues being
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addressed by critics of the 2014 World Cup in Brazil – this money could be put to
other use, including developmental needs such as providing water, electricity, and
housing to underdeveloped areas (World Development Indicators, 2012).

Economic Stimulus and Job Creation
The 2010 World Cup in South Africa added a total of R93 billion (or half
a percent) to the country’s GDP, while also directly creating 130,000 jobs and
indirectly creating 415,000 jobs. Stadium construction alone created around
66,000 jobs (albeit temporary) and generated R7 billion in wages, with R2.2
billion in wages helping to reduce poverty levels by going to households with low
income. South Africa’s unemployment rate, however, dropped only slightly from
27.9% in 2004 to 25.2% in 2010. This happened because most of the jobs created
due to the World Cup were temporary jobs, including contractual construction
jobs, which had little effect on the country’s economy. The Gautrain project, for
example, generated around 90,000 construction job opportunities, but only 3,000
of those jobs were permanent maintenance and management jobs. Nevertheless,
even though these jobs were temporary, employees acquired valuable job skills
that could be later put into use, benefitting the South African economy (IOL,
2010).

The World Cup Stadiums
Even though stadium construction greatly decreases unemployment, it
still becomes very costly to the host country. South Africa spent US$ 1.6 billion
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on stadium construction and renovation, while Brazil intends to spend around
US$ 3.0 billion, with only two stadiums more than South Africa. Stadiums are
usually very costly to build, expensive to maintain, and they lack a clear purpose
after the World Cup is over. Unlike other infrastructure projects, there are no
guarantees that stadiums are financially sustainable. Now, two years after the end
of the World Cup, host cities in South Africa have entered an extended period of
payment to maintain their stadiums, putting their financial sustainability into
question.
Table # 4 World Cup Stadium Expenditures in Rand Values
Upgrade
Stadiums

Projected annual

Cost

Construction Cost

maintenance cost

n/a

4.4 billion

5 million

Ellis Park

240 million

n/a

2.4 million

Free State

314 million

n/a

3 million

Loftus Versveld

131 million

n/a

n/a

Mbombela

n/a

1.2 million

n/a

Moses Mabhida

n/a

3.4 million

1.5 million

Nelson Mandela Bay

n/a

1.7 million

20 million

Peter Mokaba

n/a

1.3 million

10 million

Soccer City

n/a

3.3 million

15 - 18 million

Green Point

World Cup stadium cost estimate
Total government stadium expenditure
Source: Idasa, 2010

818 million
16.445 billion
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Branding South Africa
When South Africa was announced as the host country for the 2010
FIFA World Cup, there was a great deal of negativity. When, in 2004, Nelson
Mandela celebrated his country’s bid to host the event, few people thought that
South Africa would be able to cope with such a great responsibility. However,
the country proved the doubters wrong by providing the World with one of the
most successful FIFA tournaments, winning widespread praise and establishing
its name in the world. The 2010 World Cup was FIFA’s most lucrative World
Cup ever, and it gave South Africa the reputation of a country that is capable of
delivering, one that will be facing future growth. Tourists still go to visit the
country’s most exotic places. The World Cup in South Africa left a lasting legacy
of improvement to its international reputation, helping the country to bring an end
to the Afro-pessimism that had dominated foreign media for years.
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Chapter 6
“The World Cup is in Brazil, but it is not for Brazilians”

Soccer as an Expensive Sport
Fears that the country's most popular and democratic sport will become
accessible only to the wealthy population is a major problem, as tickets to attend
the games established by FIFA might start at as high as $120. This is more than
the average Brazilian can afford. Still, Brazilians are paying huge fortunes to host
the World Cup, especially because most of the funding is coming from public
money. This is also the most expensive World Cup ever, and FIFA expects to
make a good amount of money from it.
Another important note is that, even though this is a one-time event,
Brazilians will have to keep paying for the maintenance of the country's most
expensive investment: the stadiums. The annual cost of future maintenance will
be 10% of the cost of building it, which means that in 10 years, Brazilians will
have paid for the equivalent of a whole new stadium. This can be very costly for a
country that still lacks education and major infrastructure, and where the social
gap is still a significant part of people's everyday lives.

B a r r e t o | 38

Social Exclusion Cup
There are also social costs associated with the 2014 FIFA World Cup. In
many of the cities where projects are being worked on, a great number of poor
families who live in favelas (shantytowns) have been forced to abandon their
homes in order to create space for infrastructure developments, such as bus lanes
and parking lots to facilitate traffic during the event. These families are usually
relocated to suburban areas and are forced to live in an unfamiliar environment.
There are also over twenty cases in which favelas are being cleared violently, and
families are not even being offered new housing after being moved without any
warning. In Rio de Janeiro alone (one of the major cities hosting the event), an
expected 30,000 families will be displaced from the city's favelas. Preparations
have also been displacing informal workers, such as street vendors, as a way to
"clean up" the streets and reserve the zones around sites for official sponsors.
In addition to forcefully relocating families and vendors to facilitate
construction, there have also been claims of human rights violations. Workers
reported abusive working conditions during stadium construction, where too
much has to be done in a short period of time. In addition to poor working
conditions, these workers are reporting low wages and excessive hours resulting
from the government's bad planning, which has led to strikes and work stoppages
on many of the stadiums (Ortiz, 2012). According to Christopher Gaffney, a
geographer and researcher who monitors the development of large urbanization
projects in Brazil,
"with pressure mounting to finish the works, the first thing
to go are workers' rights." (Ortiz, 2011)
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World Cup for the fans, for Brazil it will be the Cup of Corruption
On July 2011, the government coalition deputies passed a bill to keep the
costs associated with the FIFA World Cup a secret, especially infrastructure
budgets, which account for most of the costs. The main objective of this bill was
to keep information away from public scrutiny, however, due to the great
possibility of corruption, the text was changed, allowing the budget to be publicly
available, but only after the projects have started. Still, Brazil is facing the
temptation of significant corruption created by this event, due to the large amount
of money involved and the need for quick decisions and construction.

Corruption in Cuiaba
Brazil already faced instances of corruption at the end of 2011, when fraud
in one of its states increased the cost of the original project. According to the
newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo, the Minister of Cities, Mario Negromonte,
changed the infrastructure project in Cuiaba (MT) from a rapid bus line to a light
rail line, raising costs to $1.2 billion dollars, $700 million dollars more than the
original amount. This agreement was made between the government of Mato
Grosso and the Presidential Palace, even though a cost analysis had already been
performed on both projects (Veja, 2011).
Along with accusations of fraud, both Jerome Valcke, FIFA’s Secretary
General, and Ricardo Teixeira, president of the CBF, were also charged with
corruption by ex-player and congressman Romario. Romario’s accusations were
based on a statement given by journalist Andrew Jennings of the BBC. The

B a r r e t o | 40

journalist cited a statement from Valcke, described as “blackmail”. Romario cited
two cases of suspected fraud, one involving International Sport and Leisure
(ISL), from which Ricardo Teixeira supposedly accepted brides, and a Mastercard
incident, in which Valcke violated a preference clause of sponsor Mastercard
against Visa. Ricardo Teixeira has already testified to Federal Police. Ricardo
Teixeira resigned from FIFA on March 3rd, 2012 (Villarama, 2012).
“Did you receive kickbacks? If your name appears in the
process, you relinquish the presidency of the CBF? Can
FIFA believe Ricardo Teixeira?"(Romario, 2011).
If Brazil is marked as the “Cup of Corruption”, this could deeply affect
future investments. Corruption directly affects Brazil’s economy, limiting growth
and investments, and jeopardizing jobs and income. Due to existing corruption,
Brazil offers investors a less stable business environment, increasing the cost of
investment, because investors will demand more money to compensate for risks
they will be facing. Brazil will then be required to pay higher interest rates due to
the lack of confidence, and will also face more difficulty in borrowing money.
Nonetheless, corruption and its effects on investment are a great challenge to a
country that is in desperate need of investments in order to pay for all its costs. As
stated before, Brazil is now, more than ever, extremely dependent on foreign
direct investment to complete its World Cup ambitions.
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Chapter 7
Public vs. Private Funding – Brazil’s BIG Problem

While infrastructure investments (roads, airports, etc.) should be financed
by the government, investments in sports facilities should be allocated to the
private sector as much as possible. This is so because investments in
infrastructure, even if started because of a sporting event, will benefit the public
and ameliorate the country’s conditions in the future. However, after observing
the behavior of countries that have hosted World Cups in the past, I have come to
the conclusion that over the past few decades, there have been massive public
sector investments in football stadiums, and even though sometimes governments
and private companies share the responsibility of making such investments
through a public private partnership, the government still plays some role in terms
of developing sports facilities. This is a challenge to underdeveloped countries
like Brazil, an issue that will be discussed later in this paper (Cabral and Junior,
2010).
It is also true that soccer stadiums, for example, have some characteristics
in common with other public projects, such as the fact that they can generate
benefits through fans that attend games, positive externalities to non-attenders,
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increased community visibility, and enhanced community image (Siegfried &
Zimbalist, 2000). However, the reason why they should be financed by the private
sector comes from the idea that there is a huge opportunity cost in building new
soccer stadiums with public funds, given that the money used for the construction
could be diverted to other projects that could bring more value to society, such as
investing in education and safety.
This describes the current situation in Brazil. When Brazil was announced
as the country that would host the World Cup, Brazilians couldn’t help but
celebrate. At that time, Ricardo Teixeira, president of the Brazilian Football
Confederation (CBF), promised publicly and repeatedly that the private sector
would provide the financing to erect the 12 stadiums to the required FIFA
standards, and that that Brazil would not spend its public money to fund the
construction – it would all come from the private sector. According to Ricardo
Teixeira,
"The less public money is invested the better the World Cup will
be. This equation is guiding the project from the beginning. The
government, at all levels, will spend on works that concern them.
The biggest investment will come from private enterprises”
(Melo, 2010)
But no private investors came forward, and Ricardo’s statement has
proven inaccurate, as government figures indicate that public capital (coming
from the BNDES, for example) is paying for most of the construction of the
stadiums (FolhadeSP, 2009).
Of the 2014 World Cup stadiums that are under construction, more than
80% of costs are being funded by public money. The work for nine of the 12
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stadiums that will be built or renovated is financed with public funds. This goes
against the idea behind PPPs, where the private sector is supposed to finance the
construction projects in return for the rights for concessions, or for the profits that
would be gained after the construction is completed. The private sector should be
responsible for seeking the best ways to finance the investments, taking this
burden away from the public sector. Still, with the lack of commitment coming
from the private sector, the government in Brazil is being forced to get involved
in several measures to make sure that everything will get ready in time.

Hesitation from the Private Sector
The main reason why Brazil's private sector is hesitant to participate more
in projects is because of the country's tax burden and tax system as a whole,
which limit business in the country. According to the World Bank survey, Brazil
ranked poorly in the amount of taxes charged and in the mandatory contributions
of labor paid by businesses as a percentage of commercial profits. Currently, the
country's average corporate tax rate is 69%, while the average median country
rate in the survey is 41%, and the Brazilian population does not see a return for
the taxes they pay.
In addition to that, Brazil has a very bureaucratic system, in which the
time it takes to prepare, file and pay corporate income tax is extremely long and
complicated. It takes companies in Brazil an average of 2,600hrs/yr to prepare and
pay taxes, while it takes other countries an average of 224 hours (Morgan Stanley,
2010).
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Using Public Money - The issue with the FGTS
The lack of resources available to fund the World Cup in 2014 has been a
challenge. As a way to minimize the problem, on November 23rd, 2011, the
Senate approved the bill Conversion No. 28 of 2011 (MP No. 541/11), which
authorizes a change in Brazilian law by allowing the use of CAIXA’S Fundo de
Guaratia por Tempo de Servico (FGTS) for the construction of stadiums, and
even private hotels, for the sporting event. Originally, this Fund was intended
strictly for the financial protection of workers who undergo difficult times, such
as being fired without a just cause for example. The fact that the Senate wanted to
use this money to fund this great event caused repercussions in the country, as the
fund’s resources were to be used for things such as the sanitation of dwellings,
construction of homes and schools, and education, and not to promote games that
probably only those with high wages may attend.
According to Congressman Rubens Bueno, from the Partido Popular
Socialista (PPS), his party would not support the use of the workers fund to
finance the World Cup.
“This is a complete deviation from the function of the
FGTS. I'm sure the Brazilian worker, who is the owner of
the fund, will not agree that the government use their
money to finance FIFA and the CBF events. Because, with
this move, the government aims to impede the enforcement
of public resources invested in the event. We will present
an outline to remove this nonsense of the text" (Bueno,
2011).
After identifying the consequences associated with the use of the Fund, on
December 15, 2011, President Dilma Rousseff announced that she would veto a
part of the bill which allowed the use of the resources of the FGTS in works
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related to the implementation of the World Cup. The fund, which when created
totaled $5 billion, just enables investments in projects in the sectors of energy,
highway, railway, waterway, port and sanitation, but nothing related to stadiums
or hotels for the World Cup. Such expenses, especially related to stadium
construction, will now be funded by the BNDES as a way to help the hosting city.

Other Implications of Using Public Money
Other than the fact that using public money to fund World Cup- related
projects takes away money that could be invested in education or sanitation, using
money from the BNDES also carries fiscal implications. On November 18, 2011,
DBRS, a full-service rating firm, upgraded Brazil's rating on long- term foreign
and local currency-denominated debt to BBB from BBB (low), creating the
conditions for an improvement in debt sustainability and improving Brazil's
creditworthiness. However, when the Treasury issues debt to aid in funding the
operations from the BNDES, the federal government's gross debt increases, and
so does its net debt, but in a longer pace. This increases Brazil's public sector
gross debt, which is already significantly higher than its net debt (63% compared
to 43%, respectively). As Brazil continues to fund infrastructure investments with
public money, this subsidized lending will further widen the gap between gross
and net debt, or in other words, the intergovernmental debt and the debt held by
the public. The more the debt increases, the more difficult it becomes for the
country to pay back what it owes. Moreover, due to the risk associated with the
fact that the country might not be able to repay the debt, its credit rating
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decreases, making it even harder for the country to borrow in the future given that
it will then be charged higher interest rates (DBRS, 2011).
Still, Brazil insists in funding the World Cup with money coming from the
BNDES. Will this method work? The answer is no.
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Chapter 8
Why the Brazil Model Does not Work

The first question that came into my mind when I decided to analyze the
public funding of stadiums was, are stadiums actually a public good? After
further study, my answer is “no”. Stadiums are exclusive and rival facilities,
given that those who do not pay for tickets can be excluded from the game. Still,
throughout my analyses, I realized that governments have some form of
participation (usually majority participation) in stadium-funding in several
countries, including the United States, even though these investments do not seem
to bring great returns.

Economic Development Due to Facility Construction
Numerous academic economists, such as Coates and Humphreys (2003)
and Baade (1996), have generally found no significant correlation between new
facilities or franchises and citywide incomes or employment. According to
independent academic economists, “Few fields of empirical economic research
offer virtual unanimity of findings. Yet, independent work on the economic
impact of stadiums and arenas has uniformly found that there is no statistically
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significant positive correlation between sports facility construction and economic
development” (Altshuler andLu beroff, 2003).
The reason for this in Brazil might be that, in the absence of a soccer
game, the Brazilian population still spends money for other recreational activities,
meaning that adding a sports facility to a city does not exactly enhance the quality
of life in a region. Instead, the facility and the soccer games change the mix of
recreational options competing for consumers’ discretionary income. It is as
though this is a zero-sum game. This might be true because, after a city builds a
stadium and starts hosting games, other recreational activities, such as attending
restaurants or going to the movies, face decreasing economic returns. This means
that most of the expenditures by fans at soccer games are just a transfer of their
discretionary recreational money from other activities that they no longer attend.
This does not mean that there are no benefits, however. It is also true that once a
city builds a stadium to host major games, it is very likely that visitors from other
cities will be attending these games as well, creating some additional revenue.
These visitors will be eating at restaurants in the host city, as well as staying in
hotels, both activities of which the government can collect taxes from.
Still, just because economic returns are not high, that does not mean that
there are no social returns. There are intangible forces that make governments
want to invest in stadiums, such as the fact that home teams house an emotional
civic pride within the community. Once the facility is built and the city hosts
games, people can cheer for it, read about it in newspapers and magazines, and
brag about it to out-of-town friends and relatives. The city then becomes better
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known by others- like Syracuse, for example, which enjoys worldwide notice for
its basketball history. This indirect benefit is a very strong force, and to the extent
that teams generate civic pride, subsidies to teams and arenas may be efficient
(Zaretsky, 2001).
Regardless of the social and economic benefits brought to the city, it is
also true that governments participate in stadium-funding in very distinct ways.
While in the US state and local governments funds many stadiums, in Brazil, the
federal government funds almost all of them. What makes the American system
of stadium-funding work better than the Brazilian?

Doing it Right – The American Way
In order to perform an accurate analysis, the government costs for
stadium-financing for the 2014 World Cup were compared to NFL stadiumfunding in the United States, an economically stable country with an established
history in hosting sporting events. Like Brazil, the US places great importance on
professional sports (while Brazil places a great importance mostly in soccer),
which are an obsession of Americans and fans all over the world. For my
analyses, I chose the 20 most recent NFL stadiums, the oldest one being FedEx
Field, opened in Washington during 1997 (Baade and Matheson, 2006).
Throughout my data analyses, I noticed that the US took a very different
approach regarding the state and federal funding of football stadiums. Of the 20
NFL stadiums built since 1997, public funding only exceeded 50% in 13 of the
stadiums, while two of them were just for renovation (Wilhelm, 2008) For the
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remaining seven stadiums, private entities had majority participation. I then
calculated the percentage and average for all the public funding used for all 20
stadiums, which gave me a total of 45% and an average of 56%. This means that
even though the majority of the stadiums are government-owned, the government
participation is still not immensely significant (Baade and Matheson, 2006).

Table # 6 NFL Stadiums – Public/Private Funding Comparison
Source: Cbsminnesota, 2011
Table # 6 NFL Stadium - Public and Private Sector Investments
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Source: Cbsminnesota, 2011
I then compared these numbers to Brazil’s current situation. Brazil intends
to have 12 stadiums ready to host the 2014 World Cup games. So far, of these 12
stadiums, only three are privately owned, while the remaining nine stadiums are
supposed to be funded by the government. According to the Brazilian
Transparency Portal, of the R$26.501 billion (this number still does not reflect all
the costs) that will be invested for the World Cup, R$6,694.70 billion will be
spent on stadiums only, and of that number, 82% will be coming from public
money.
It is clear that the US government participation in NFL stadium
construction is a lot smaller; Brazil’s government is investing much more of its
money compared to the private sector than the American government is.

Exemption of Federal Income Taxes
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This, however, is not the only difference I encountered when comparing
stadium-funding in Brazil and in the US. In the American model, which sector of
the government is investing the money is also very distinct from the Brazilian
model. In the US, it has become commonplace for cities, counties, and states to
use a combination of broad-based taxes (sales and property taxes) or special taxes
(taxes on alcohol and tobacco consumptions, hotel rooms and car rentals) to help
build or operate, but it is unusual to see direct involvement by the federal
government (Baade and Matheson, 2006).
The role played by the United States in helping these cities fund these
facilities is quite unique: the federal subsidy comes into play when the stadium is
financed with state or local bonds, issued at below-market interest rates and paid
for by exemption of the bonds' interest income from federal income taxes (1996).
To put it simply, to pay for new stadiums, the local or state government usually
issues bonds. These municipal bonds require the issuer to make interest payments;
however, these interest payments are not subject to federal income tax burden for
bond holders.
For the issuer, or the state/local government, the cost of servicing the bond
debt is reduced, due to an interest figure lower than the going market rate.
Therefore, because of the tax exemption, the taxable bonds can be paid at a lower
cost to the purchaser, thus facilitating the stadium funding. Again, this does not
happen in Brazil.
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Table # 7 Brazilian Stadium Funding
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Source: Data taken from Portal de Transparencia, GCU, 2012
All of the nine publicly funded stadiums for the 2014 World Cup are
receiving at least 45% of the money from the BNDES, or the Federal government.
In seven of these nine stadiums, the BNDES has majority participation (51% or
more). Unlike the US, however, the Brazilian Federal government is directly
involved in the funding, meaning that the BNDES funds the stadiums with the
country’s money, and not via tax exemptions.
The money being invested in sports facilities are quite substantial
considering the overall contribution the industry makes to the economy. This
creates a great burden to the country that already has to spend significant amounts
of money for other purposes. Instead of focusing on stadium funding, the federal
government should instead be focusing on real public investments. In addition,
the Federal government is lending money to the states, not donating. The Federal
bank is releasing about R$400 million for each publicly funded stadium for the
World Cup, but someone will have to pay this money back to BNDES.

Where Are the Revenues?
When deciding to invest in stadiums, the Brazilian government was not
considering the long run, and how this investment could be used for something
else. Spending money on a public stadium must be done by reducing investment
in another area of government service. Due to the fact that Brazil is under
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pressure (given that there are only a little more than two years left before the
World Cup) and was not able to attract enough private investment, the country is
spending too much money on an investment without great economic returns.
First, tax revenue increases from stadiums will not be sustainable in a
country like Brazil. Different from the United States, Brazil has one main sport,
soccer, and the majority of its existing stadiums cannot be used for any other sport
other than soccer. In the US, if the government invests on stadiums, it can then
collect revenues from increase spending in and around the stadium, such as other
economic activities like restaurants. It then becomes a valid use of public money.
In Brazil however, unless there is an important soccer game going on, the
Brazilian population usually does not attend any other activities that might happen
at stadiums.
Second, the Brazilian government will have to keep investing capital to
maintain the stadiums after the event is over, and the Brazilian stadiums will not
again be utilized for 8 months after the World Cup. This is true because the
stadiums’ infrastructure will have to be modified so that they “fit” the Brazilian
reality. Currently, the stadiums being reformed or constructed have to meet the
FIFA standards, which exclude the use of fences and place fans at a very short
distance from the sidelines. These standards cannot be adopted by the country due
to the high degree of violence during soccer games. With that, Brazil will only
start making money from the stadiums a whole year after their construction,
which is when the country will begin to incur maintenance costs as well (Agencia
Brasil, 2011).
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Payback Period
Studies have been done on the revenue forecast for each stadium that will
be used in the World Cup. According to BSB - Brunoro Sport Business, a sporting
consultancy company, stadiums for the world cup will cost more and will have
less revenue after the event than those built for the two previous World Cups. The
costs are 32% higher than what was spent in South Africa and 46% higher than
what was spent in Germany, in 2006. The government claims that costs will still
increase.
The analysis done by the company gives either the annual revenue forecast for
each stadium after the World Cup is over, or the payback period, which allows
me to calculate the missing variable for each of them. However, it is important to
note that for my calculations, I am (a) using revenues, without taking into account
the costs of maintenance and operation, and (b) not taking into account the time
value of money.
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City - State of
Stadium

Total

Forecast of

Payback

Invested in

Annual CFs

Period

millions

in millions

(years)

Brasília – DF

R$

688.30

R$

4.12

Rio de Janeiro – RJ

R$

883.50

R$

110.00

8

Salvador – BA

R$

597.00

R$

13.88

43

Manaus – AM

R$

532.20

R$

2.51

212

Table # 8 Payback Period for Stadium Investments in Brazil

167
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Cuiabá – MT

R$

518.90

R$

3.99

130

Belo Horizonte – MG

R$

695.00

R$

38.61

18

Natal – RN

R$

417.00

R$

2.57

162

São Paulo – SP

R$

820.00

R$

82.00

10

Porto Alegre – RS

R$

290.00

R$

26.36

11

Source: Data taken from Portal de Transparencia, GCU, 2012

This shows that Brazil will only be able to pay for each stadium
investment after at least a decade, without counting the maintenance costs, that
add up to almost R$ 3.8 billion per year ($2 billion dollars) per year.
It is not about looking at the size of the investment, but rather at its
efficacy. Unlike the United States, Brazil does not have multipurpose arenas.
According to Marcelo Doria, the president of BSB, “the Staples Center, Los
Angeles Lakers, has 70% of revenue coming from shows. In Brazil, sports are not
treated as entertainment, the way they do in other countries. It is all very focused
on box office income that comes from soccer only” (2011).
The payback period is so long because of the limited amount of activities
that happen inside stadiums, so Brazil needs to take better advantage of the
structure being created. Some of the stadiums have a very long payback period, so
the government has to encourage more activities to further generate revenues.
Now, due to the fact that the cost for tickets cannot increase too much (given that
a large pertentage of Brazilians would not be able to afford it and less people
would be attending the event), the only way out to increase net income is by
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focusing on restaurants, VIP areas for business on game days, sponsorship and
licenses, including “naming rights”, advertising, rental space for concerts, fairs
and events, and other sources of income with the use of hotels, museums, and
shops outside the stadium.

Chapter 9
An Alternative way to fix the Problem

Brazilian states are not able to fund sport facilities on their own; they lack
the capital required to do so. The Federal government does not have a budget

B a r r e t o | 62

surplus; Brazil is a country in desperate need of improvement in areas such as
education and safety. The BNDES is funding most of the World Cup investments,
which will come in the form of a bill later on. How can the implications of using
public funds for the World Cup be minimized?
After analyzing all the costs related to the event as well as statistics from
the United States, I have come to the conclusion that there is no way that the
Brazilian model will work; Brazil is just accumulating sunk costs. The fact that
the private sector is not willing to commit to the World Cup investments forced
Brazil to appeal to its public finances, thus spending more money than the country
expected. It is also true that Brazil cannot use the American model of tax
exemption of municipal bonds, since states lack the necessary money to put in
stadium investment in the first place. But what if these tax exemptions were
offered to a sector that had the necessary resources to invest on the sport
facilities?
After analyzing the current issue, I have concluded that instead of insisting
on using the money from BNDES or CAIXA, Brazil should find a way to attract
the private sector so that the federal government (or the state and local
government, which do not have enough capital) won’t have to cope with such a
costly responsibility. But how can the country incentivize the private sector to
invest on such costly projects like stadiums? My suggestion is tax holidays6 and
phase outs7.

Tax Holidays and Property tax Phase-out
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I believe that the only way for Brazil to avoid crippling stadium costs is
by making such investment more attractive for the private sector. Since stadiums
in Brazil do not generate substantial economic activity, private entities are
reluctant to put their money into such an investment, unless they believe that they
will get sufficient return. As it has been proposed by State Senator Roger
Chamberlain, to assist construction financing for a new Vikings stadium and
incentivize private investment, property tax phase-out should be offered for
private businesses to contribute to stadium construction as well as a sales tax
holiday on construction equipment.
To take out the burden imposed on the public sectors, the host state and
city should provide a sales tax exemption on not only stadium and off-site
____________________
6
Tax Holidays: A government incentive program that offers a tax reduction or
elimination to businesses.
7
Tax phase-out: The gradual reduction of a tax credit as a taxpayer approaches
the income limit to qualify for that credit (Investopedia, 2012).

transportation construction materials, but also property tax exemption on the
stadium property. In addition, the private investor should be given the approval to
schedule any activities it wishes to inside the stadium. Then, this property tax
exemption should also be applied to any facility on or as a part of the stadium site
that the private entity may choose to operate, including retail stores, restaurants,
etc., but the private entity would still be subject to the City’s entertainment tax.
Obviously, the private entity would also retain the invested percentage amount of
event related revenues, including any incremental ticket tax or ticket surcharge.
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If the private sector takes on some of the stadium construction
responsibility, Brazil can use its public money on other issues that Brazil already
lacks. This would decrease a big part of the costs associated with the World Cup,
allowing the state to invest in other parts (such as security and transportation) that
are not only necessary for the World Cup, but also vital for the country.
Moreover, Brazil is still facing the challenge of being able to complete all stadium
constructions and renovations before the 2014 World Cup. If the country is not
able to meet the deadline proposed by FIFA (which is for June 2013 for the
Confederations Cup), the government will only be incurring sunk costs.
Lastly, another valid point is that if a private entity is responsible for
stadium financing, the state would not be liable for the stadiums maintenance
costs after the 2014 FIFA World Cup is over. Just in South Africa, those costs
added up to almost R$ 3.8 billion per year ($2 billion dollars), which is something
that an emerging country cannot afford yet. Therefore, Brazil should put greater
efforts into incentivizing investments from the private sector so that it can
successfully host the 2014 FIFA World Cup and not suffer the damages of such
an event decades later (DowntownEastStadium, 2012).
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Chapter 10
FIFA World Cup: Improving Brazil
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As sporting events are becoming more popular around the world, high
competition to host those events is rising. International events such as the World
Cup are able to bring the host country several benefits that might change the
country’s perception to the world and improve its internal conditions, two
important factors for economic growth. As the FIFA 2014 World Cup host
country, Brazil plans on taking advantage of those benefits, which include
boosting its economy through the rise of trade and advertising during the event,
improving its infrastructure, boosting its tourism industry as tourists come to
watch the event, branding itself to the world, etc. Amid all the obstacles on its
path to success, this can be Brazil’s chance to establish its identity as a financially
stable and civilized nation.

Economic benefits
The FIFA 2014 World Cup is projected to have a substantial economic
impact in Brazil. The economy is expected to snowball, increasing by five times
the amount invested directly in event-related activities, with indirect effects being
produced after the tournament. A recent study conducted by Ernst & Young
forecasted that this mega event could create about R$ 142 billion in economic
activity for the country from 2010 – 2014. It also estimates that the event,
including the preparations for it in the 12 host cities, will lead to a rise in tax
revenues, generating an additional R$ 18.13 billion in the collection of direct and
indirect taxes by local, state and federal governments.
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The study conducted also revealed that the World Cup’s direct impact
on the Brazilian GDP is estimated to be R$64.5 billion for the same period of
2010-2014, which accounts for over 2.7% of GDP.

Foreign Direct Investment
According to the Brazilian Central Bank, Brazil posted a current
account deficit of $7.086 billion in January 2012, wider than the gap it registered
in December 2011. However, as Brazil develops offshore oil finds and
modernizes its infrastructure for the World Cup, the country expects a huge
capital inflow coming from Direct Foreign Investment (FDI). In 2011, Brazil
received a near record $75.4 billion in FDI, and according to Jankiel Santos, chief
economist at Espirito Santo Investment Bank, it looks like the current account
will continue to be easily financed by FDI in 2012 too.

Chart # 9 Current Account Balance vs. FDI (US$ bn)
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FDI can be very beneficial for Brazil by helping in the economic
development of the country; FDI can create high-quality jobs associated with
higher wages and better working conditions. With increased multinational
enterprise (MNE) activities, there is an improvement of productivity and export
capacity, positively affecting the country’s trade balance. These MNEs engage in
international trade, increasing their share of total exports and imports. Plus, FDIs
are a very important element for the 2014 World Cup (Colitt and Ragir, 2006).

Tourism Industry
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The tourist inflow that is expected into the country will not only
benefit Brazil directly – with the fans who will watch the games, but also
indirectly, due to international media exposure. From 2010 – 2014, it is expected
that 2.98 million visitors will be arriving in the country, and over 600,000 tourists
will be visiting Brazil for the World Cup alone, bringing the country an additional
R$3.6 billion (or 2 billion dollars).
The inflow of tourists will bring the country a significant infusion of
funds, especially to areas such as transportation, communications, hospitality,
culture, entertainment and others. Visitors will be spending money purchasing
goods and services, increasing consumption and eventually production for
companies.

Table # 10 Visitors Projected Spending
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Source: Ernst & Young, 2011

Job Creation
According to studies also conducted by Ernest & Young (2011), the World
Cup is also expected to create an estimated 3.63 million jobs/year and R$ 63.48
billion of income for the population, thus impacting the domestic consumer
market. However, because this is a onetime event, most of its impacts will not be
permanent, which is why this estimate accounts for temporary jobs only.

Infrastructure Improvements
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"Our involvement with the 2014 Cup is directly linked to our
desire to show the importance of this event for the development of
Brazilian infrastructure, with the objective of giving -- starting in
2015 -- greater visibility to international tourism and moving
Brazil one step closer to fully integrating itself in the world of
developed countries." (Joao Alberto Viol, president of
SINAENCO) (Cerda, Fernandes, Madanes and Suarez, 2011).
When Brazil was announced as the host country for the 2014 FIFA World
Cup, the country was given perhaps one of the single best opportunities for it to
improve its internal infrastructure. Brazil's infrastructure is poor by international
standards, causing implications for logistics and limiting GDP growth. With the
2014 World Cup however, Brazil will be heavily investing in its infrastructure,
thus bringing huge long term benefits to the country, especially because
infrastructure improvements will most likely bring more FDI (foreign direct
investment) into the country and improve sovereign ratings. When Standard &
Poor’s reviewed Brazil's sovereign rating (which is currently a foreign currency
rating of BBB and stable outlook), it identified the country's insufficient and
inefficient infrastructure as a major problem limiting sustainable growth; the
FIFA World Cup is giving Brazil a chance to change that.
This mega event presents the country with a unique chance to upgrade its
transportation system, an improvement that will definitely help Brazil to raise its
perception in other countries. The sectors that will benefit the most from this
event will be construction, food and beverage, utilities(electricity, gas, water,
sanitation and urban cleaning) and information services – all together they will
increase output by over R$50.18 billion. In addition to those sectors, business
services and real estate services will also benefit a lot from the tourist inflow that
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the country is expected to receive, and the country will be ready for hosting the
2016 Olympics.
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Table # 11 Direct and Indirect Impact on GDP
Source: Ernst & Young, 2011
Social Benefits
With a successful World up, Brazil will be developing a reputation for

efficient management and changing the way it is seen by other countries. The
country will be showing the rest of the world that it is not only soccer and samba,
it is also a center of excellence in research, development and innovation. Brazil
will show the international community that it is capable of hosting such a
challenging event, presenting to all other countries its stable and robust economy,
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as well as modern and multicultural cities. However, in order to enjoy all of these
benefits, Brazil has to identify those opportunities and act on them through
governance and planning, monitoring, control and transparency, time
management and legacy. It is Brazil’s time to shine.
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Table # 12 Brazil’s Benefits from Hosting the Word Cup

Source: Ernst & Young, 2011
Ending Remarks
In 2009, Brazil was given an opportunity. It is finally Brazil’s chance to
prosper, and to show the world what it is capable of. If the country is able to host
a successful 2014 FIFA World Cup, the benefits coming from the big event will
change Brazil’s perception not only to other countries, but to its citizens as well.
Brazil will face huge infrastructure improvements as well as investments coming
from different countries that want to take advantage on this sudden growth. Still,
it has to be careful.
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While this sounds like the perfect opportunity, it is also one that requires a
lot of capital investments. With the present lack of interest from the private sector,
large quantities of Brazil’s public money is being invested in nonpublic goods,
leaving the Brazilian population very unsatisfied with the overall organization of
the event. Now, Brazil should focus on incentivizing the private sector to take
over some of these projects allowing the government to concentrate on hosting
one of the world’s most notable World Cups in history!
Even though Brazil has a very short time to prepare for the event, the
country has all the resources it needs; it is just a matter of knowing how to use
them. I truly hope that in the next two years Brazil will fix itself and really focus
on taking advantage of the opportunity it was given. It is Brazil’s time to shine at
what is does best: playing soccer.

Best of Luck!
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Summary of Capstone Project
“We did it, we did it!” These were the words coming from the bid team in
March 2009, when Brazil was elected host country for the 2014 World Cup. The
room where its bid team gathered turned into a lively party, with members
hugging, dancing, and crying while they waived the Brazilian flag. Now, that the
World Cup is less than three years away, Brazil finds itself in a challenging
situation.
In my analyses, I introduce the challenges faced by the country as it
prepares itself for the great event. After analyzing the current Brazilian model for
World Cup funding, I’ve concluded that such a model is not the ideal one for the
country, and introduce alternative methods to put Brazil on the right path for a
successful 2014 World Cup.
I start my analysis by introducing the country, from history to financial
markets. The information provided in this first chapter gives the reader a
background on the country, so that he/she can further understand the significance
of soccer in Brazil.
In chapter two, I introduce the topic of soccer, the Brazilian way. In this
chapter I explain the history of the sport in the country, including who introduced
it and when, as well as how soccer has evolved throughout the years. Famous
players such as national heroes Pele and Ronaldinho are mentioned in this part of
my paper as a way to show the sport’s popularity, which has made soccer the true
Brazilian identity. Finally, after 64 years of fascination with soccer, Brazil earned
the chance to host the 2014 World Cup, the world’s most famous sporting event.
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However, as time between now and the 2014 World Cup decreases, Brazil is
finding itself in a difficult situation, which is the topic to be introduced next.
In chapter three, I define the existing challenges of hosting the 2014
World Cup. This is where I mention the infrastructure challenges, violence, the
excessive layers of bureaucracy in the country and introduce the major costs
associated with the sport event as well as who will pay for all those costs.
However, in order to further explain the financing of the 2014 World Cup, I first
define the main terms I will be using throughout my analysis.
Chapter four is all about financial investments and definition of terms. I
define terms such as public - private partnerships, private sector, and public
sector, all of which will be often used throughout my paper. I then ensure that my
reader is aware of the Brazilian National Development Banks and its financial
rates, since this will also be an important factor throughout my analysis.
In chapter seven, I introduce a case study – a comparison between the
South Africa 2010 World Cup and the forecasts for the Brazilian 2014 World
Cup. I start this chapter with a macroeconomic comparison, followed by some
differences and similarities between economic indicators for both Brazil and
South Africa in 2009 (before both World Cups). This situates my reader and gives
them an even better understanding about both countries. I then introduce South
Africa’s costs related to the 2010 World Cup, along with how the country used its
private and public money to fund the event. This leads me right into the
construction of the World Cup stadiums and its impact on job creation. Here, I
show my reader how, unlike other infrastructure projects, there are no guarantees
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that stadiums are financially sustainable. I prove that two years after the end of
the World Cup, host cities in South Africa have entered an extended period of
payment to maintain their stadiums, putting their financial sustainability into
question. Still, even with the high costs associated with such facilities, I end this
chapter with the benefits of the 2010 World Cup, such as the lasting legacy of
improvements in South Africa’s international reputation, helping the country to
bring an end to the Afro-pessimism that had dominated foreign media for years.
The World Cup is in Brazil, but it is not for Brazilians. In Chapter five, I
introduce the big debate over the World Cup funding – should the public’s money
be used for the preparation of this event? Due to the lack of vibrant private sector
investment, the Brazilian government is using its federal budget, coming from the
BNDES, creating long term financial implications to the country. In this chapter, I
also introduce the major problems associated with the use of the worker’s fund,
and how the Brazilian population is responding to such an issue.
It is not until Chapter six that I further develop my analysis as to why the
Brazilian model of investing in the World Cup does not work. I focus on stadium
construction, as stadiums can be considered a nonpublic good with no high
economic returns on investment.
In order to perform an accurate analysis, the government costs for stadium
financing for the 2014 World Cup were compared to NFL stadium funding in the
United States, an economically stable country with an established history of
hosting sporting events. Differences between state and federal government
investment are introduced, including exemptions from federal taxes on bond
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issuance. Then, an alternative way to fix the Brazilian Problem of stadium
funding is presented in the form of tax holidays to the private sector as a way to
incentivize their investment.
Chapter seven presents other problems that the 2014 World Cup can bring
to Brazil. For this chapter, I focus on soccer being an expensive sport which can
further turn the World Cup into a social exclusion cup as well as a Cup of
corruption. The many corruption cases that have occurred in Brazil as well as
corruption related to the World Cup, might compromise what is supposed to be
one of the world’s most popular sporting events.
Finally, chapter eight concludes my analysis, proving that even though
Brazil will be facing several challenges, if it is able to succeed, the FIFA World
Cup can be very beneficial to the country. Aside from the direct economic
benefits associated with the event, Brazil is already enjoying an increase in
foreign direct investment and in tourism, bringing the country a significant
infusion of funds. In addition, the country’s eventual development in
infrastructure will be beneficial not only for the event and for the 2016 Olympics,
but also for the country in the long run, since Brazil is in desperate need of
infrastructure improvement. Lastly, I talk about the social benefits that Brazil will
be experiencing when it finally hosts the event. Brazil will be showing the rest of
the world that it is not only soccer and samba; it is also a center of excellence in
research, development and innovation. If the country succeeds, it will show the
world that it is capable of hosting such a challenging event, presenting to all other
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countries its stable and robust economy, as well as modern and multicultural
cities.

